We show that if the set of subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs of a stage game is convexified by the introduction of public random variables, then forward induction loses all its power as an argument for refining Nash equilibrium. We establish that our argument does not depend on a convenient choice of off-equilibrium path beliefs.
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to suggest that forward induction is much less powerful than is usually supposed as a tool for refining noncooperative solution concepts. In any finite extensive form game having a "stage game" structure, the logic of forward induction is so fragile that it cannot survive the introduction of public randomization. Since publicly observed random variables are available to players in most settings of interest, perhaps a reconsideration of the status of forward induction is warranted.
Following its introduction by Kohlberg and Mertens [7] , the term "forward induction" has taken on many shades of meaning. Here we use it to refer to the process by which players infer from a choice of some player what he or she is likely to do subsequently. This is distinct from phenomena such as signaling private information about one's type (Cho and Kreps [3] ), but is of the essence for understanding the signaling of strategic intent. Taking account of the possibility of signaling strategic intent is important not just for equilibrium analysis but also for studying rationalizable strategic behavior in the extensive form. Our principal focus, however, will be on the force of forward induction as an equilibrium refinement.
Although there is a substantial and stimulating literature on forward induction (see especially Kohlberg and Mertens [7] , Osborne [10] and van Damme [12] ), there is no consensus on what the term "forward induction" should mean. Fortunately, the point of this paper can be made without resolving that issue. We show that even in its strongest form, forward induction is impotent when the set of equilibrium payoffs in each subgame is convexified via public randomization.
In section 2 we present a well-known example to illustrate our results. Section 3 describes finite stage games and defines for any stage game Γ an associated game Γ c with public randomizing devices at the beginning of each period. Section 4 gives two definitions, one stronger than the other, of forward induction-proof equilibrium. We then present two propositions concerning the solution concepts. The first proposition, relatively transparent, shows how to take any subgame perfect equilibrium σ of a game Γ and construct another subgame perfect equilibrium σ f of Γ c having the same equilibrium path and satisfying forward induction-proofness. For the purposes of this proposition, we use the weaker notion of forward induction-proofness. One could object that no convincing justification is given for the out-of-equilibrium beliefs needed to support the equilibrium σ f ; if the beliefs seem contrived, then the force of the proposition as an assault on forward induction is diminished. Also, one might insist on a stronger notion of forward induction-proofness.
The second proposition is offered as an answer to both of the preceding objections.
Given an equilibrium σ, partition the actions of each player at each stage into a relevant set and an irrelevant set as follows: an irrelevant action a i for player i is one such that it is (strictly) unprofitable for i to deviate from σ by using that action no matter which subgame perfect solutions were to govern play following the deviation (i.e., in subgames that are reached by action profiles (a i , a −i ) for a −i that are played with positive probability in σ).
In short, no one could conceivably gain by using an irrelevant action to signal strategic intent. The second proposition says that for a generic class of stage games, any Γ in that class, any subgame perfect equilibrium σ of Γ, and any > 0, there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium σ g of Γ c within of σ that is strongly forward induction-proof (that is, uses all relevant actions). No role is played by expectations held in out-of-equilibrium contingencies and hence no opportunity is left for forward induction to rule out any subgame perfect equilibrium. In section 5, we discuss the interpretations of public randomization devices and our results.
An Example
Consider the extensive form game in figure 1. 1 It has two subgame perfect outcomes:
(7, 7) and (10, 2). To support the (7, 7) outcome, player 2 when reached must choose f with sufficient probability. Consider any equilibrium that supports the (7, 7) outcome. Suppose player 1 deviates and player 2's information set is reached. Player 2 should understand that this means player 1 has forgone a payoff of 7. If player 1 had played d, she could not have achieved a payoff as high as 7 regardless of what player 2 did. Thus, player 2 must conclude that player 1 must have chosen c and should respond with e. This yields player 1 a payoff of 10. Since player 1 can anticipate player 2's line of reasoning, she should deviate from a, her action in the proposed equilibrium. Thus, no equilibrium in which player 1 plays a is forward-induction proof.
Next, imagine a publicly observable random variable θ whose realization will be observable by both players after the time at which player 1 has to choose between a and b and before any further choices are made. Suppose θ has a continuous distribution. Let G be the cumulative distribution of θ, and let θ * satisfy G(θ * ) = 2 3
. If player 1 believes that player 2 will choose e whenever θ ≤ θ * and f otherwise, then player 1 will be indifferent between choosing a or choosing b followed by c if θ ≤ θ * and by d otherwise. To see this, note that the latter strategy yields an ex ante payoff of 2 3
× 10 + 1 3 × 1 = 7, which is the same as the payoff associated with choosing a. Consider the subgame perfect equilibrium of the convexified game above in which player 1 chooses a at her first information set and in the subgame starting with nature's choice of θ, player 1 and player 2 behave as described above. Now if player 2 is reached, he concludes that player 1 has failed to choose a, not due to an intent to signal, but out of indifference. At the time at which player 1 chooses to deviate from the equilibrium-prescribed action a, rationalizing her decision to do so does not necessitate an argument that precludes player 1 from ever choosing d. It simply requires that d not be played too often. The proposed equilibrium (of the convexified game) above ensures that d is not played too often. Our Proposition 1 generalizes the preceding analysis to arbitrary stage games. In section 4 (Proposition 1), we will show that any subgame perfect equilibrium can be rendered forward induction-proof as described in the above example in the presence of publicly observable random variables.
One could object to the beliefs assigned to the players after player 1's choice of b.
Perhaps we should have required that, after the deviation by player 1, player 2 should seek an explanation that makes player 1 strictly better off compared to the equilibrium. Or perhaps the beliefs specified are inappropriate for some other reason.
Suppose we now adjust the original equilibrium so that player 1 chooses a with probability 1 − and b with probability . Then if b is chosen, player 1 chooses c and player 2 chooses e if θ ≤ θ * and player 1 chooses d and player 2 chooses f if θ > θ * . Note that this is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the convexified game in which there are no unreached subgames. Hence this equilibrium is immune from any forward induction argument. Moreover, by choosing small enough, the equilibrium distribution over terminal nodes can be made arbitrarily close to the outcome of the equilibrium that was eliminated in the nonconvexified game. Our Proposition 2 generalizes this analysis to arbitrary stage games for generic payoffs. The idea of Proposition 1 is essentially as straightforward as its application to the example above. Proposition 2 is more delicate because an perturbation will affect payoffs in the previous stage; this complicates the analysis when more than one player has a non-trivial choice at a given stage.
Definitions
This paper considers finite extensive form games with perfect recall (see Kuhn [8] or Selten [11] ). Our results concern games having a stage game structure. Such a game can be thought of as taking place over T periods, with decision-makers in any period t fully informed about what happened in the first t − 1 periods but totally ignorant about others' play in period t.
Definition 1: For any positive integer T , a finite extensive game Γ with perfect recall is a stage game of length T if there exists a surjective map f from the choice nodes of Γ to the set {1, . . . , T } such that (i) for each t ∈ {1, . . . , T } and each node x such that f (x) ≥ t, x belongs to some subgame whose origin y satisfies f(y) = t; and (ii) if subgame τ has origin z with f (z) = t, then if an information set I for player i in τ contains an x with f (x) = t, any choice node x of i in τ such that f (x ) = t is also in
I.
Condition (i) ensures that a "true" subgame follows every (t−1)-period history. Thus, what happened in the first t − 1 periods can be regarded as common knowledge at the beginning of period t. Condition (ii) requires that when making a choice in period t, no player has any information concerning other players' choices in period t. Consequently play within a period is, in the informational sense, simultaneous. Notice that not all players are necessarily active in a particular period t following some history h. A game of perfect information, for example, is a stage game. Moreover, the "component game" played in period t may depend on the history h, which may in turn include chance moves by nature.
Thus, finite dynamic and stochastic games are included in this class.
Definition 2: Let θ 1 , . . . , θ T be independent random variables, each uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. Modify the stage game Γ of length T as follows: at the beginning of each period t, before that period's play commences, the realization of the random variable θ t is publicly observed. Thus, choices in period t can be conditioned on θ t (in addition to the (t − 1)-period history). We call the new game the convexification of Γ and denote it Γ c .
The particular choice of distribution for θ t is not important; any non-degenerate continuous distribution will suffice. The role of the random variables is to convexify the set of subgame perfect equilibrium values from the beginning of each period onward. The opportunity of conditioning on the realizations of a continuous random variable substantially complicates the strategy sets of the players and introduces a number of technical issues. In order that expected payoffs may be computed, strategies must satisfy obvious measurability requirements. Moreover, it is possible that players' strategies at stage t could depend on the realization of earlier random variables. Our main objective is to show that if the SPE payoff set is convex, forward induction loses all its force. For this it will be sufficient to consider equilibria in which strategies do not depend on earlier realizations.
Furthermore, the simplicity of the strategies we construct will make measurability easy to verify.
Forward Induction in Convexified Games
Forward induction usually involves an inference that, because some player i has chosen a particular action or sequence of actions, there are certain things i will not do subsequently in the game. Some applications require only iterative dominance reasoning, while others use a particular equilibrium as a status quo point of reference. In some cases, the aforementioned "inference" is based on lines of reasoning that are less than compelling. We do not attempt a sophisticated formulation of forward induction here. This section presents two crude definitions of forward induction-proof equilibrium, both of which are biased toward eliminating candidate solutions. We then give two results showing that once public randomization is allowed for, our first definition of forward induction admits all subgame perfect equilibrium paths as solutions. Moreover, even our more restrictive definition of forward induction permits equilibrium distributions over terminal nodes arbitrarily close to any subgame perfect equilibrium distribution for generic stage games.
Standard principles of backward induction are incorporated into the definition by recursion on T , the length of the game. (ii) there exists another SPE γ of Γ (or the convexification of Γ) such that if i (after observing θ t ) deviates to a i and all others play according to σ in period t and γ in the remaining T − t periods, then the deviation is strictly profitable for i.
To define a relevant action, we replace (i) above with "a i is not used," and we replace the phrase "strictly profitable" in (ii) above with "not strictly unprofitable."
Clearly, every threatening action is a relevant action.
Definition 4: Let Γ be a stage game of length T , or a convexification of such a game.
A forward induction-proof equilibrium of Γ is defined recursively as follows:
(1) for T = 1, a strategy profile σ of Γ is forward induction-proof if σ is a Nash equilibrium of Γ;
(2) for T = 2, 3, . . ., a profile σ of Γ is forward induction-proof if it is a subgame perfect equilibrium of Γ and if (a) the continuation equilibria induced by σ on the (T −1)-period subgames following the first period are forward induction-proof; and (b) no player has a threatening action (relative to σ).
A strongly forward induction-proof equilibrium is defined by replacing "threatening" with "relevant."
Suppose that in some subgame perfect equilibrium (hereafter SPE), player i did have a threatening action a i . The idea is that if i were to deviate by playing a i , others would conclude that i did not believe that σ would henceforth govern play. Players might then coordinate on some other equilibrium lucrative enough for i in the remaining periods to explain the deviation to a i .
Note that in defining a threatening action (i.e., for forward induction-proofness) we considered only those deviations that yield a payoff strictly below the equilibrium payoff of player i, given the behavior prescribed by the equilibrium σ for i's opponents. According to this definition, an action which yields the same payoff as the equilibrium payoff for player i provides no opportunity for strategic signaling. Such an action yields a payoff no better or worse than what player i would have obtained in equilibrium and hence does not constitute an implicit speech in the sense of Cho and Kreps [3] .
On the other hand, for defining a strongly forward induction-proof equilibrium, any unused action is viewed as a possible vehicle for signaling. Moreover, we require that following a deviation to such an action, every SPE yield a strictly lower payoff. We offer the following observations about the two definitions of forward induction-proofness presented above:
(1) In defining both notions of forward induction-proofness, we do not insist that the alternative equilibrium on which the players might coordinate after player i deviates be forward induction-proof. This makes it easier to find threatening or relevant actions, and renders our definitions more restrictive.
(2) For the reason described in item (1) above, it is easy to verify that a strongly forward induction-proof equilibrium is also a forward induction-proof equilibrium since a threatening action is always a relevant action.
(3) The notion of a strongly forward induction-proof equilibrium is the strongest notion of signaling strategic intent by deviating from equilibrium that is consistent with subgame perfection. If a player has no threatening action in the sense of Definition 4, then he will have a strict incentive not to deviate provided he believes that every deviation will be followed by a subgame perfect equilibrium in the subsequent subgame. However, it is difficult to compare our notion to the "never a weak best response"
property (NWBR) of Kohlberg and Mertens (see Proposition 6.B of their paper). For understanding why even the weaker of our two notions of forward induction is too restrictive, the game in figure 2 is particularly telling. It seems reasonable to argue that in whichever subgame they are reached in period 2, players 1 and 2 will play their unanimously preferred equilibrium and each receive 5. Player 3 should therefore choose action k (choosing l is like "burning a dollar" a la Ben-Porath and Dekel [1] and van Damme [12] ). According to our definition, this equilibrium is upset by the threatening action l, because although l is a bad move for player 3 in the candidate equilibrium, it would be a good move if it convinced players 1 and 2 to switch to the equilibrium in which they both get a payoff of 1. But does this make any sense? Player 3 plays no strategic role in either second-period subgame, so there is no scope for player 3 to signal strategic intent.
Perhaps player 3 can signal her beliefs; but why should players 1 and 2 care? Admittedly, it is conceivable that they could be influenced by player 3's choice-perhaps each of them thinks that the other thinks the way player 3 does, and player 3 apparently thinks that playing l will result in the outcome (1, 1, 4). But this is a slim argument for throwing out the original equilibrium. For this and other reasons, it seems fair to say that the definition rejects candidate solutions too readily. In spite of these restrictive notions of forward induction, Propositions 1 and 2 show that in the presence of public randomization the definition imposes essentially no restriction beyond subgame perfection.
Since the strategy sets in the two games Γ and Γ c are different, the statement that an equilibrium of one is the same as or close to an equilibrium of the other requires some clarification. We will refer to the finite set of terminal nodes of Γ as physical outcomes.
Thus, each profile of mixed strategies in Γ yields probability distributions over physical outcomes. Similarly, the more complicated strategy profiles of Γ c can also be associated with probability distributions over physical outcomes of Γ. We will say that a strategy profile σ c of Γ c is close to σ of Γ if the distribution over physical outcomes implied by σ c is close to the distribution over physical outcomes implied by σ.
Proposition 1: Let Γ be a stage game of length T and σ be any SPE (subgame perfect equilibrium) of Γ c , the convexification of Γ. There exists a forward induction-proof equilibrium σ f of Γ c having the same equilibrium distribution over physical outcomes as σ.
Proof: It is easy to check that the presence of the public randomizing devices in Γ c ensures the convexity of the subgame perfect equilibrium value set for the subgame following any t-period history. We establish the main proposition via an induction on T . It holds trivially for T = 1. Suppose that the proposition has been established for T = 1, 2, . . . , t − 1. We need to show it holds for t.
Let σ be an SPE of Γ c , a convexified stage game of length t. For each action a i for player i that is threatening in the first period (with respect to σ), there is by definition some collection (a i ) of preferable (t − 1)-period subgame perfect equilibria (a −i , a i ) (for each a −i played with positive probability in σ) such that in the profile agreeing with (a −i , a i ) in subgames following the choice a i , and with σ everywhere else, i would strictly gain by a "one-shot deviation" to a i . Thus, each (a −i , a i ) is an equilibrium of the subgame of Γ c starting with the initial node reached by (a −i , a i ), while (a i ) refers to the collection (a −i , a i ) (one for each a −i played with positive probability). Notice that depending on which subgame perfect continuation we choose (one from σ or (a i )), a i is either strictly undesirable or strictly desirable, relative to the first-stage behavior for i stipulated by σ.
By the convexity of the set of SPE values after any first-period history (noted earlier), we can therefore choose a collection of SPE's ∼(a i ) for the subgames in question such that in the profile agreeing with ∼(a i ) in those subgames and with σ elsewhere, i is indifferent between a i and the behavior stipulated by σ. Choose ∼(a i ) to be forward induction-proof in every (t − 1) subgame (this is possible by the inductive hypothesis and by the axiom of choice, which is needed because θ t takes an uncountable number of values).
Define a new strategy profile σ f in Γ c as follows:
(1) In period 1, σ f agrees with σ.
(2) Following any first-period history in which the number of players who have chosen actions that are threatening with respect to σ in Γ c is not exactly one, replace the continuation equilibrium induced by σ on the subgame by a forward induction-proof equilibrium having the same distribution over physical outcomes. That this is possible follows from the inductive hypothesis.
(3) Following any first-period history in which exactly one player i has chosen a threatening action (with respect to σ in Γ c ), say a i , replace the continuation equilibrium induced by σ in the subsequent (t − 1)-period subgame by ∼(a i ), defined above.
We claim that σ f is forward induction-proof. It is an SPE because (i) by construction its continuation profiles following all first-period histories are subgame perfect; and
(ii) no deviation in the first period is profitable: payoffs to non-threatening actions are unchanged, and for each action a i that is threatening, ∼(a i ) was chosen so that in σ f the relevant player is indifferent between a i and the equilibrium choice.
The indifference noted in the preceding sentence means that in the first period, there are no threatening actions with respect to σ f in Γ c . This, together with the fact that all continuation profiles following period one histories were chosen to be forward inductionproof, implies that σ f is a forward induction-proof equilibrium.
The import of Proposition 1 is that forward induction is powerless to refine the set of subgame perfect equilibria of stage games with public randomizations. One might question the seriousness of this result by saying that, in the equilibrium σ f defined in the proof, the beliefs off the equilibrium path concerning future play, particularly following actions that were threatening with respect to σ, are contrived. Perhaps the construction of σ f unduly exploits the freedom to manipulate these expectations at unreached information sets.
Moreover, the definition of forward induction requires that if a deviation does not yield a strictly lower payoff than the equilibrium in question, then it can not be used as a "credible" implicit speech. In a forward induction-proof equilibrium, a player may interpret player i's deviation as an attempt to secure this equilibrium payoff in a different manner, even when it is possible to interpret it as an attempt to attain a strictly higher payoff.
Proposition 2 is offered to give assurance that the result is not essentially dependent on a convenient choice of off-equilibrium path conjectures, nor on a heavy-handed use of the deviating player's indifference. Starting with an SPE σ of Γ it constructs a nearby SPE σ g of Γ c that is forward induction-proof and that uses all the previously relevant actions with positive probability in equilibrium. In σ g , the only unused actions available to players as "signals" are those that are "irrelevant" in the sense of Definition 3: they cannot be profitable whatever equilibrium they trigger in the remainder game.
Hence Proposition 2 establishes that given convexification any extensive form refinement that builds on subgame perfection and operates by restricting beliefs on unreached information sets is impotent in generic stage games. This follows from the fact that we can render all deviations irrelevant. Player i is always worse off by choosing a i in period t given what i's opponents are doing in period t and any subgame perfect continuation after period t.
Proposition 2: Let Γ be a stage game with terminal nodes. There exists an open set U * ⊂ IR n such that IR n \U * has Lebesgue measure zero and, for any u ∈ U * , SPE σ of Γ(u), and > 0 there exists a strongly forward induction-proof equilibrium σ g of Γ c (u)
such that the probabilities of any given physical outcome when play is governed by σ g and σ, respectively, differ by less than .
The proof of Proposition 2 is given in the appendix. To see how the proof works and why the genericity condition is needed, consider the slightly modified version of figure 1 contained in figure 3. Note that (a, β) is a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of this game whenever x ≤ 7. Moreover the analysis of the deviation by player 1 to the strategy b in stage 1 is analogous to the analysis of the same deviation in figure 1. To construct an equilibrium of the convexified game in which player 1 is deprived of the signaling opportunity that this deviation affords, we would once again like to construct an equilibrium in which b is used with some small probability, . This necessitates that we construct a continuation payoff for player 1 after action b that yields her a payoff of 7. Consider using the same strategies for both players as described in section 2.
This will yield a payoff of two to player 1 and a payoff of (1 − )7 + 2 3 × 10 + 1 3 × 1 to player 2. If x < 7, we are done. We can choose as small as we wish and have an equilibrium path that is arbitrarily close to (a, β). Moreover no player will have an unused strategy that could be used as a signal to unravel the equilibrium. Note, however, that any strategy profile in the subgame that is reached with (b, β) in the convexified game yields a total payoff no greater than 11 for the two players. Thus any subgame continuation that yields 7 to player 1 must yield less than 7 to player 2. Hence, if x = 7 then we can not construct a SPE in which player 1 plays a with a high probability, b with some positive probability, and player 2 plays β with any probability. This is due to the fact that if player 2 is achieving a payoff close to 7 and is indifferent between a and b, then player 2 must be getting less than 7 after playing β (while he can guarantee 7 with α). Thus, for x = 7 the payoff vector of Γ is not in U * . For x = 7 there exists no σ g , an equilibrium of the convexified game, such that for the SPE σ = (a, d), (β, f) conditions 2a and 2b in the definition of strongly forward induction-proof are satisfied.
In order to be able to construct an equilibrium σ g close to the equilibrium σ of the original game we need to ensure that for every subgame perfect equilibrium of any subgame of Γ, there exists a neighborhood of the original payoff vector such that the SPE correspondence is continuous in the payoff vector within the neighborhood. The proof of genericity in the appendix establishes that this is the case for an open, full-measure set of payoffs.
Discussion
Convexifying an extensive form game by adding publicly observable random variables typically alters the set of equilibrium distributions over terminal nodes. However, the effect of convexification is sensitive to the solution concept used. For example, the Nash equilibrium distributions of Γ c can be identified with the convex hull of the Nash equilibrium distributions of Γ. Proposition 1 above establishes that the forward induction-proof equilibrium distributions of Γ c constitute a much larger set than the forward induction-proof distribution of Γ. Convexification has an important role because the game Γ c is strategically very different from the game Γ. To see this, consider again the game in figure 1. For this game any strategy that reaches player 1's second information set and entails choosing action d at that information set is strictly dominated. This is not true for the convexified version of the game. As can be seen from our analysis of section 2, one can construct many equilibria in the convexified game in which player 1's second information set is reached and d is chosen. The fact that convexification saves certain actions from being dominated suggests that other refinements also lose their power to restrict equilibria in convexified games. Thus it seems clear that convexification of stage games in the manner described in this paper is very effective in rendering a refinement powerless. Our final task will be to discuss how such convexification can be interpreted or justified.
Our view of publicly observable random variables is similar to the standard view of mixed strategies. We consider them not as the outcome of pregame communication or design but rather a ubiquitous element of the environment. Such random variables are ignored in the formal description of the game the same way that private randomization (i.e., mixed strategies) is ignored. In our view, coordinating on a possibly payoff-irrelevant public random variable is entirely compatible with the non-cooperative spirit of Nash equilibrium, as is coordinating on a payoff-irrelevant history in the celebrated folk theorems of supergames. Moreover, the analysis of Proposition 2 establishes that one could, for generic stage games, perturb the payoffs so that the random variables on which agents condition are no longer payoff irrelevant and thus extend Harsanyi's [6] well-known purification result to our context.
In any event, our case for the impotence of forward induction goes beyond games where public randomizing devices play a role. More generally, we are noting that forward induction derives its power entirely from non-convexities in value sets (of equilibria in subgames). These sets may be convex for many reasons other than public randomization:
think of an infinitely repeated game with little discounting, for example; or games with unrestricted simultaneous "cheap-talk" possibilities between stages. 3
We do not, however, wish to suggest that Proposition 2 forces one to view all subgame perfect equilibrium as being on equal footing. The stage game structure, and hence the opportunity to observe a public random variable at the right time, is crucial for our analysis.
Moreover, in certain games there might be other reasons to eliminate equilibria, perhaps because the prescribed behavior or beliefs along the equilibrium path are viewed as being implausible. We suggest only that the class of games in which the logic of forward induction alone leads to severe restriction is rather limited.
Appendix
Genericity : The purpose of this section is to provide a set U * ⊂ IR n where n is the number of players and is the number of terminal nodes in Γ, such that for every u ∈ U * , Proposition 2 applies for the game Γ(u).
The notation needed for the subsequent discussion of genericity is prohibitively difficult for the case of an arbitrary Γ. Therefore, we will restrict attention to the simple two-stage 2-person game Γ depicted in figure 4 . The game Γ is special for a number of reasons: first, every player is active in every stage, after any history; second, every player has exactly two action choices at every one of his information sets; third, there are two players; fourth, there are only two stages; and fifth, there are no chance nodes. The fact that none of the discussion below rests on the first three properties of Γ will be immediately obvious. There is a simple argument that shows how the analysis below can be extended to games with a larger number of stages and chance nodes. This we will present at the end of this section. Observe that the first row of u j 's are the payoffs for player 1 and the second row are payoffs for player 2. Without loss of generality, we will restrict attention to payoff vectors u ∈ IR 32 ++ . Note also that proper subgames of Γ can be viewed as one-shot games. These have been labeled G 1 , G 2 , G 3 , and G 4 in figure 4 . The set of mixed strategies for the game G j will be denoted Σ Since the choice of m will always be clear from the context, we will simply write µ, instead of µ m , µ k , etc.
For the proof of Proposition 2, it is sufficient that Γ(u) satisfy the following:
(i) For j = 1, 2, 3, 4 every best response is used with positive probability in every Nash
every best response is used with positive probability in every Nash equilibrium s 0 of
(ii) For every s = (s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , s 4 ) ∈ NES(u), and every for j = 1, 2, 3, 4
and h j (x) is a Nash equilibrium of G j (x) for every x ∈ O j . Moreover, the h j 's are locally unique. That is,h
Gul, Pearce, and Stacchetti [4] , henceforth GPS, provide the following formulation and results.
For any normal form game G (for v ∈ IR n ), let g : IR n ×IR n → Σ(G) be a continuous function such that g(ŝ, v) =ŝ if and only if s is a Nash equilibrium of G(v). GPS construct such a function g and define a strong non-degenerate Nash equilibriumŝ of G(u) as one that satisfies the following properties:
(1) Every best response is used with positive probability inŝ.
is the Jacobian of g with respect to s (i.e., the first n arguments) evaluated atŝ. Moreover, this h is unique in the sense described in (ii) above. A v is called a regular payoff vector if every Nash equilibrium of G(v) is strongly non-degenerate. Comparing (i) and (ii) to (1) and (2b), respectively, establishes that (i) and (ii) would be satisfied if (I) for all j = 1, 2, 3, 4, u j is a regular payoff vector for j;
(II) for all s ∈ NES(u), v 0 (s, u) is a regular payoff vector for G 0 .
Thus, our task is reduced to establishing the existence of a generic subset U * of IR
++
such that (I) and (II) hold for every u ∈ U * . For this, we will use two more results from GPS (result 1 is well-known). Let G be an arbitrary n-person game.
Result 1: If v is a regular payoff vector for the game G, G(v) has a finite number of Nash equilibria.
Result 2: There exists a generic subset V of IR n ++ such that every v ∈ V is a regular payoff vector for G. Proof: It is sufficient to show that A ⊂ X, µ(A) > 0 implies µ f(A) > 0. This will be done in two steps.
Step 1:
Then by assumption we have µ(A) > 0 and det f (x) = 0 for all x ∈ A.
Let B be a collection of open subsets of X such that x ∈ θ ⊂ X and θ open implies there exists B ∈ B such that x ∈ B ⊂ θ. Such a collection exists; for example, let for each x ∈ X an open set θ x ⊂ X such that f is 1 to 1 on θ x and hence there exists B x ∈ B such that x ∈ B x ⊂ θ x and f is 1 to 1 on B.
[Note that we are using the axiom of choice here.] Since B is a countable collection, so is B * = {B x | x ∈ X}. Obviously, x∈X B x = X and since x∈X B x is the union of a countable collection of sets, it must be that µ a ∩ B x > 0 for some B x ; otherwise, we would have µ(A) ≤ B∈B * ψ (A ∩ B) = 0 which is a contradiction. By the change of variable formula, we have
Since ψ (A ∩ B) > 0 and det f (x) > 0 for all x ∈ A ∩ B, the left side of the equality is strictly positive. The right side is equal to µ f(A∩B) and hence µ f (A) ≥ µ f (A∩B) > 0 as desired.
Step 2:
where x m−k ∈ IR m−k and x k ∈ IR k . Since the columns of the Jacobian of f are linearly independent, so are the columns of the Jacobian of F , i.e., det F (x) = 0 for all x ∈ X. By It follows from (2b) that for any u ∈ U and s j ∈ NE(G j ) there exist open sets
, and a function
j is continuously differentiable and "unique" see (ii) above for a description of the sense in which h j is unique . By result 1, NE(G j ) is finite for all j. 
Fix any B ∈ B * and ψ ∈ Ψ B and view v 0 u, ψ (u) as a function from B to IR Thus, J(u) has rank 8 for every u ∈ B. Moreover, by result 2 there exists a generic set
++ such that every v 0 ∈ V 0 is a regular payoff vector for G 0 . Hence, by the lemma,
; by the finiteness of Ψ B , U B is also a generic subset of B. For the case of an arbitrary stage game Γ, we would essentially have to repeat the construction of B * and Ψ B so that the payoffs associated with earlier stages can also be viewed as continuously differentiable functions of u and Nash equilibria s(u) of the later stages. This becomes notationally cumbersome, but entails no novel ideas. The argument for establishing that the Jacobian of v u, s(u) has full rank is also independent of the number of players and stages. Chance nodes would further complicate the functions v u, s(u) . In particular, even the payoffs of the final stage g "one-shot" games would now have to be viewed as weighted averages of terminal node payoffs. However, the analysis would still remain unchanged.
Proof of Proposition 2 (for the general case): The proof is by induction. Obviously, the statement is correct for T = 1. Suppose it is true for T − 1. Let Γ be a T -stage game. Let σ be the SPE in question. By the induction hypothesis, we can replace the behavior in each (T − 1)-stage subgame of Γ with a forward induction-proof continuation such that the distribution over physical outcomes is as close to the distribution specified by σ as desired. This, together with the genericity assumption see (ii) in the discussion of genericity above , guarantees that there existsσ which specifies forward induction-proof behavior in every (T − 1)-stage subgame of Γ, is close to σ in stage 1, yields a distribution over physical outcomes that is arbitrarily close to the one associated with σ in Γ, and is an SPE of Γ c . Again by the genericity of Γ see (i) in the discussion of genericity , every action a i is either used with positive probability or is threatening or irrelevant, and an action in Γ c givenσ is threatening iff the same action is threatening in Γ given σ.
The purpose of the remainder of this proof is to modifyσ so that in every (T − 1)-period subgame following an action profile a / ∈ n i=1 I i the behavior agrees withσ, where I i is the set of (T −1)-stage subgames of Γ that can be reached by a profile in which exactly one player i plays a threatening action and all others play according to σ, and in period 1 the behavior is close to that inσ, and the resulting profile is forward induction-proof in the strongest sense: i.e., there are no unused relevant (and hence no threatening) strategies.
Construct γ as follows: for every a ∈ I i , in the subgame associated with a, players play a forward induction-proof equilibrium arbitrarily close to player i's favorite SPE. This is possible by the induction hypothesis. In any subgame after a / ∈ n i=1 I i , and in period 1, players behave according toσ. By the definition of a threatening action, our construction of γ, and strong non-degeneracy i.e., (i) in the discussion of genericity , every threatening action a i yields a higher payoff for player i, againstσ −i , than the strategyσ i . Let k denote the total number of threatening actions and let λ denote a generic element of [0, 1] k . Each coordinate of λ is understood to correspond to a particular threatening action. Let λ a i denote the entry of λ associated with threatening action a i . Let G(σ, λ) denote the game obtained from G(σ), G(γ), λ as follows G(γ) for arbitrary strategy profile γ of Γ is defined in section 3 : the payoffs associated with a in G(σ, λ) are the same as in G(σ) if a / ∈ n i=1 I i and are equal to λ a i , (1 − λ a i ) weighting of the payoffs associated with a in G(σ) and G(γ), respectively, if a i ∈ I i . Let G(σ, λ, ) denote the perturbation of G(σ, λ) in which the payoff to any strategy profile s in G(σ, λ, ) is the same as the payoff associated withs in G(σ, λ) wheres i = (1 − )s i + s i and s is a fixed profile in which every agent's strategy places positive probability on all threatening strategies and only threatening strategies.
As in the simpler case covered in section 3, if is sufficiently small, then
